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11.1  Introduction 
This paper adds to the existing literature on the returns to company training 
by using a self-selection model for calculating both the wage and welfare ef- 
fects of within-company schooling in the Netherlands. Earlier research on the 
returns to within-company training includes Mincer (1988), Barron, Black, and 
Loewenstein (1989), Brown (1989), Holzer (1988), Lynch (1992), Lillard and 
Tan (1986), and Booth (1991). A survey of this research leads to the conclusion 
that the wage effects of  within-company job training are between 4 and  16 
percent. Within-company schooling is defined in this paper as courses and 
schooling organized by a company and accessible to employees of that com- 
pany. These courses can be taken either within the company itself or at some 
outside training institution. Also, they can be organized either for employees 
of the company only or for employees of other companies as well. The outline 
of  this paper is as follows: In section 11.2, we describe the model and the 
estimation method; the data are described in section 11.3; estimation results 
are presented in section 11.4; and section 11.5 concludes. 
11.2  Model and Estimation Method 
We  assume that there are separate wage regimes for workers who have par- 
ticipated in within-company schooling and for workers who have  not. Both 
wage equations have the usual semilogarithmic form, in which the log of the 
wage rate is a linear function of  a vector of human capital variables (X) with 
coefficients (p). The wage rates for those who have participated and for those 
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who have not are denoted by w1 and w2,  respectively. We further assume that 
the decision whether to participate is governed by weighing the costs and bene- 
fits of the investment. The investment costs are assumed to be a linear function 
of individual characteristics (Y)  and associated coefficients (p,).  The benefits 
of  investing in within-company schooling are represented by the percentage 
wage gain: (log w,  -  log w2).  Finally, let I be an index function describing the 
investment decision. The model is summarized in equations (1)-(3). 
(1)  log w,  = PIX  + E,, if I = 1, 
(2)  log w2  = P,X + E~,  if I = 0, and 
(3) 
where I = 1 iff I* > 0, and I =  0 iff I*  5  0, and  c2,  and E~ are identically 
and independently normal distributed random terms capturing unmeasured and 
unmeasurable variables. 
Substitution of the wage equations into the selection equation (3)  yields 
(34 
I*  = (log w,  -  log w,) -  p,Y + E,, 
I* = (Pi -  P,>X -  P,Y  + E3  + El -  E, 
= (Pi -  P,>X -  PJ  + CL. 
The simultaneous equations system (l),  (2), and (3a) will be estimated by max- 
imum likelihood. Let p, be the correlation coefficient between E, and p, and 
pz the correlation coefficient between s2  and p. Further, letflq, p, p,) be the 
bivariate density function of E, and p, andf(E2, p, p,)  the bivariate density of 
E, and p. The likelihood function of the switching regression model is 
(4) 
where  J = ((PI -  p,)  X -  p,Y) / u3.I The distribution  is  characterized  by 
E(E,)~  =mi,  E(E~),  =  u:,  E(K)~  =  u:,  E(s2p)  =  pp,,  and E(E,~)  = p2u2. 
The wage gain to within-company schooling can be calculated by the dif- 
ference  between  the  expected  log of  the  wage  rate  with  company  school- 
ing and the expected value of the log wage rate without company schooling. 
Because  of  self-selection,  the  wage  gains  differ  between  participants  and 
non-participants.  First,  we  discuss  the  wage  gain  for  participants.  Let 
E(1og wll I = I, X, PI)  be the expected value of the log wage rate with com- 
pany schooling for those who have participated in within-company schooling 
(I = 1) for a worker with characteristics X,  and let E(1og w21 I = I,  X, P,)  be 
the expected wage rate a participant would have received if she had not partici- 
pated in within-company schooling. The wage gain for participants in within- 
company schooling is 
L =  k.0  -J [f  (El,EL,  PIh  n, = 0 _m j-’f  (E2’  CLY P2) dI-4 
1. Usually in these types of switching regression models a coefficient for the wage differential 
is identified. However, since this coefficient has no natural interpretation in our model, we identify 
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where  cp  is the density function and  the distribution function of the stan- 
dard normal. 
The total wage gain or conditional wage gain can be decomposed into a 
participation effect (p, -  p2)X and a self-selection effect (ppI -  p,u,)cp(-J)/ 
(1 -  a(  -4).  The participation effect corresponds to the unconditional wage 
gain, i.e., the expected wage gain prior to the investment decision. The sign of 
the self-selection effect is determined by  (plo, -  pp,).  If  each group has an 
absolute advantage in  the  alternative it has  chosen, i.e., if  participants in 
within-company schooling are better off with company schooling and nonpar- 
ticipants are better off without it, then pI > 0 and p,  <  0. In this case, the self- 
selection term is positive, and the conditional wage gain for participants ex- 
ceeds the unconditional wage gain. 
In a similar way,  we can determine the wage gain nonparticipants would 
have  received,  had  they  participated  in  within-company  schooling.  Let 
E(1og wII  I =  0, X,  PI)  be the expected value of the log wage rate nonpartici- 
pants  (I =  0) would have received had they participated in within-company 
schooling, and let E(1og wJ  I =  0, X, P,) be the expected wage rate a nonpar- 
ticipant receives  without company  schooling. The  expected wage  gain  of 
within-company schooling for nonparticipants is now 
Again, if each group has an absolute advantage in the alternative chosen, the 
self-selection effect is negative and the conditional wage gain for nonpartici- 
pants is less than both the unconditional wage gain and the wage gain for parti- 
cipants. 
If  we subtract the costs of  within-company schooling from the wage gain, 
we have the net value of within-company schooling. This net value is termed 
the “welfare gain” by  Bjorklund and Moffitt  (1987). The costs of  within- 
company schooling are represented by  p3Y  in the selection equation. The bal- 
ance of costs and benefits is denoted by I*. As with wage gains, welfare gains 
differ between participants and nonparticipants. Let E(I*I  I = 1, X,  I: P)  be the 
expected welfare gains for participants (I = l), and E(I*l I =  0,  X, X P) the 
expected welfare gains for nonparticipants (I = 0). The welfare gains for parti- 
cipants are calculated by 
(7)  E(I*l  I = 1, x, I:  P) = (P, -  P,>X -  P3Y + 
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The expected welfare gains for nonparticipants are 
(8)  @*I  1  = 0, x,  E  P) = (P, -  PJX -  PJ -  a,cp(-J)/  @(-J). 
11.3  The Data 
The data are taken from the Brabant survey of 1983. This data set contains 
information  on  2,587  individuals  who  were  in  the  sixth grade  of  primary 
school in the Dutch province of Brabant in 1952. These individuals were inter- 
viewed in 1952 and in 1983. The 1952 records include information on IQ and 
social background. The 1983 questionnaire included questions about postpri- 
mary  (i.e.,  postcompulsory)  schooling careers, enterprise-related  schooling, 
present job status, earnings, etc. (details of the survey can be found in Hartog 
1989). 
From this data set we have taken a subsample of wage earners. After elimi- 
nating observations with missing values on essential variables,  1,057 observa- 
tions were available for analysis. So, the data are a cohort of employees who 
were approximately 43 years old in 1983. 
The human capital variable (X)  in the wage equation includes years of edu- 
cation  after  primary  school,  years  of  work  experience,  work  experience 
squared, and IQ. In the wage equation, we further include job level (1 =  low, 
7 = high) and gender (1 = female, 0 =  male). The cost of  the investment in 
enterprise-related  schooling (Y)  is assumed to be a linear function  of work 
experience, four dummy variables for the highest educational level attained, 
IQ, gender, and a dummy variable  indicating whether the highest education 
attained was general education. The four education dummy variables are coded 
as follows:  (1) school after primary  school but no certificate  was obtained 
(dropout); (2) lower vocational and lower general education (low); (3) interme- 
diate vocational  and intermediate  general education  (intermediate);  and (4) 
higher vocational education and university (high). 
Table 11.1 contains some sample characteristics. For the entire sample, the 
following conclusions can be drawn from the descriptive statistics: (1) About 
a quarter of the workers have invested in within-company schooling. (2) An 
average worker in our sample has about four and a half years of postcompul- 
sory education. About 60 percent have a general education. (3) Almost 82  per- 
cent of the workers are male. 
From a comparison of the participants and nonparticipants, the following 
conclusions  can be drawn:  (1) On average, participants  in  within-company 
schooling earn about  11 percent more than  nonparticipants.  (2)  Participants 
have invested less in formal education than nonparticipants. Workers with gen- 
eral education are underrepresented among the participants. (3) The average 
IQ of participants is higher than that of nonparticipants. (4) Women are under- 
represented among the participants. (5) On average, participants have higher 
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Table 11.1  Sample Means (standard deviation in parentheses) 
Total Sample  Participants  Nonparticipants 
~ 
N 
Participate in within-company schooling 
Log wage rate 
Years of  education after primary school 
































































11.4  Estimation Results 
Table 11.2 contains the estimation results. The most interesting findings in 
the selection equation are those on educational levels. The reference category 
consists of workers with primary school only. For the lowest category (drop- 
out) the coefficient is significantly positive, for the middle categories (low and 
intermediate) the coefficients are insignificant, and for the highest category 
(high) the coefficient is significantly negative. These results imply that within- 
company schooling and educational dropout are complements, that  within- 
company schooling and low or intermediate education are independent, and 
that within-company schooling and higher education are substitutes. 
Capabilities, measured by  IQ, and within-company schooling are comple- 
ments. The investment in within-company schooling increases with experience 
as well. Finally, women invest less in within-company schooling than do men. 
Comparing the two schooling regimes according to the coefficients in the wage 
equations  gives  an  impression  of  the  productivity-augmenting effects  of 
enterprise-related schooling. 
The returns to postcompulsory formal education are not affected by the in- 
vestment in enterprise-related schooling. The rate of return to a year of post- 
compulsory schooling is 2.5 percent for those without company schooling. The 
rather low estimate of the rate of return to formal schooling is partly due to the 
inclusion of IQ and of demand-side variables (i.e., job level) in the wage equa- 
tion. Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient of the schooling variable is mea- 
sured somewhat imprecisely in the post-company-schooling wage equation. 304  Wim Groot, Joop Hartog, and Hessel Oosterbeek 
Table 11.2  Parameter Estimates (t-values in parentheses) 
Wage Equation 
With Company  Without Company  Selection 
Parameter  Schooling, p,  Schooling, p,  Equation, p, 
Intercept  -0.061  1.684**  -3.805** 
(0.079)  (6.108)  (4.402) 
Experience  0.143*  0.019  0.035* 
(2.040)  (0.842)  (2.066) 
(Experience)2/100  -0.296  -0.036 
(  1.854)  (0.698) 
Years of  education  0.021  0.025** 
(1.540)  (5.219) 
Education 
Dropout  0.476** 
(3.079) 
Low  0.180 
(0.968) 




(3.580)  (5.996)  (4.029) 
(1.972)  (3.505)  (3.725) 
Job level  0.026  0.073** 
(1.148)  (5.682) 
U  0.407**  0.427**  1.246 
(26.005)  (40.680)  (0.995) 
P  0.751**  -  0.758* * 
(22.598)  (23.999) 
High  -  1.259** 
General education  -0.025 
Gender  -0.501 **  -0.221**  -1.158** 
IQ"  0.607*  0.463**  0.018** 
Log likelihood  -943.037 
"IQ was divided by  100 in the wage equations. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the  1 percent level. 
Only in the post-company-schooling wage equation is there a pronounced 
experiencelwage profile; in  the wage  equation without  company  schooling 
both experience variables are insignificant. Moreover, in absolute terms, the 
magnitude of the coefficients of  the experience variables are larger in the post- 
company-schooling wage  equation, implying a  steeper experience profile. 
These findings corroborate the human capital hypothesis that the concave ex- 
perience profile is caused by investments in on-the-job training. 
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Table 11.3  Wage and Welfare Gains of Participation in Within-Company 
Schooling 
Wage Gain  Welfare Gain 
Unconditional  -0.408  0.353 
Participants  0.212  1.891 
Nonparticipants  -0.803  -0.421 
schooling. Without company schooling, the wage rate increases with each job 
level by  approximately 7.3 percent; with enterprise-related schooling this in- 
crease is only about 2.6 percent. The male-female wage differential is much 
larger in the wage equation with company schooling than in that without. With- 
out company, schooling women earn 22 percent less than men; with company 
schooling the differential is 50 percent. The findings imply that the rate of 
return to enterprise-related schooling for women is less than the return for men. 
This lower rate of return explains why women invest less in within-company 
schooling. 
The signs of  the correlation coefficients, pI >  0 and p2 <  0, imply that the 
allocation of  workers into within-company schooling is determined by  abso- 
lute advantage. Those who participate in company schooling have an absolute 
advantage in doing so over those who do not participate: participants earn more 
than nonparticipants would have received had they also participated. Similarly, 
nonparticipants have  an absolute advantage in nonparticipation over partici- 
pants: nonparticipants earn more than participants would have earned had they 
not invested in within-company schooling. 
In table 11.3, the wage and welfare gains of participation in within-company 
schooling are calculated for a representative individual in the sample. This 
representative individual, defined by the sample means and modal values, is a 
male with 4.6 years of postcompulsory education, a little over 25 years of work 
experience, and an average IQ. 
The unconditional rate of return is defined by (PI -  P,)X. The unconditional 
wage effect of participation in within-company schooling is -40.8  percent.2 
The interpretation of  the unconditional rate of return is quite different from 
the interpretation of the rate of return conditional on (n0n)participation. The 
unconditional rate of return corresponds to the expected rate of return, for a 
randomly chosen individual in our sample, prior to the investment decision. 
As we do not account for the outcome of the investment decision, the uncondi- 
tional rate of  return gives the returns to observable characteristics only. The 
conditional rate of return includes the returns to unobserved characteristics as 
2. Based on separate OLS wage equations (not presented here) for participants and nonpartici- 
pants (i.e., neglecting the self-selection effects), the unconditional wage effect of participating for 
the representative individual is 8 percent. 306  Wim Groot, Joop Hartog, and Hessel Oosterbeek 
well, as far they are revealed by the outcome of the investment decision. For a 
participant, these returns represent the wage gains that the participating repre- 
sentative worker receives from participating, over the situation in which this 
representative worker would not have participated. For a nonparticipant  the 
calculated rate of return represents the wage gain this nonparticipating repre- 
sentative worker would have received had he participated in enterprise-related 
schooling. 
The wage effect for participants  is 21.2 percent;  that is, a representative 
participant  in  our  sample  earns  21.2  percent  more  after  within-company 
schooling. The wage effect for nonparticipants is -80.3  percent. This implies 
that a nonparticipant with the observable characteristics of a representative in- 
dividual earns 80.3 percent more than he would have earned had he partici- 
pated in within-company schooling. 
For participants, the welfare gains are greater than the wage gains. For a 
nonparticipant, the welfare gains are negative, but less negative than the wage 
gains. Unlike the unconditional wage gains, the unconditional welfare gains 
are positive. The interpretation of this outcome is that the costs of participation 
in within-company schooling are negative; ignoring pecuniary compensation, 
workers enjoy participating in within-company schooling. 
11.5  Conclusions 
In this paper we have calculated the wage and welfare gains of participation 
in within-company schooling. The main findings are the following: (1) On av- 
erage, participants  in within-company  schooling earn  11 percent more than 
nonparticipants. (2) Within-company schooling and educational dropout are 
complements; within-company schooling and low or intermediate education 
are independent; within-company schooling and higher education are substi- 
tutes. (3)  The allocation of workers into within-company schooling is based on 
absolute advantages: participants are better off with company schooling, while 
nonparticipants are better off without it. (4) For a representative worker in the 
sample, the wage effect for participants is 21.2 percent, and the wage effect 
for nonparticipants is -80.3  percent. (5)  The welfare effects are greater than 
the wage effects. This implies that the costs of participation in within-company 
schooling are negative. 
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